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Abstract
We show that the Shapley-Shubik power index on the domain of simple
(voting) games can be uniquely characterized without the e¢ ciency axiom. In
our axiomatization, the e¢ ciency is replaced by the following weaker require-
ment that we term the gain-loss axiom: any gain in power by a player implies
a loss for someone else (the axiom does not specify the extent of the loss). The
rest of our axioms are standard: transfer (which is the version of additivity
adapted for simple games), symmetry or equal treatment, and dummy.
JEL Classi￿cation Numbers: C71, D72.
Keywords: Simple Games, Shapley-Shubik Power Index, E¢ ciency Axiom.
1 Introduction
Shortly after the introduction of the Shapley (1953) value, Shapley and Shubik (1954)
suggested to use its restriction to the domain of simple (voting) games in order to
assess the a priori voting power of players. This restriction had since become known
as the Shapley-Shubik power index (SSPI). The SSPI measures the chance each player
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1has of being critical to the success of a winning coalition, if players join in a random
order. In addition to being an attempt to quantify the elusive voting power, the SSPI
can also be regarded as the utility of playing a simple game under a certain posture
towards risk (see Roth (1977)).
The construction of the SSPI points the way to de￿ne other indices with broadly
similar features. The Banzhaf (1965) index is a prime example, with a long history of
successful applications and sustained academic interest. Like the SSPI, it evaluates
players￿probabilities of having a swing vote in the game, but under assumption
that each player joins a coalition or abstains from joining with equal probability
and that the choices of di⁄erent players are independent. Yet more general are the
probabilistic assumptions on coalition formation behind the family of semivalues of
Dubey et al (1981), de￿ned for all games, whose restriction to the domain of simple
games produces a variety of power indices (studied in Einy (1987) and also termed
semivalues). One way of delineating the di⁄erences between indices is the axiomatic
approach ￿certain critical properties (axioms) of the given index are identi￿ed, and
then are shown to uniquely characterize it, thereby setting it apart from other indices.
The Shapley (1953) value was the ￿rst solution concept of cooperative game theory
to be axiomatized. However, the SSPI, its spin-o⁄, received similar treatment much
later (in Dubey (1975)). Dubey (1975) uses the axioms of Shapley (1953), with the
exception of additivity, which has to take up a special form1 due to the non-linear
structure of the set of simple games. The axiom of e¢ ciency, according to which the
total power of the players must be equal to 1, the worth of the grand coalition in
the game, is the primary distinguishing feature of the SSPI. It is, in fact, the only
e¢ cient semivalue on the domain of simple games.2
In this paper we propose a new axiomatization of the SSPI, that replaces e¢ ciency
(which has been central in most axiomatizations) by a weaker axiom. While retaining
some ￿ avor of e¢ ciency, the new axiom which we term the axiom of gain-loss3 is
quantitatively less demanding. According to the gain-loss axiom, if the power of
some players increases as a result of changes in the game, it cannot concomitantly
1It later became known as the transfer axiom, due to Weber (1988).
2See Theorem 2.5 and Remark 2.7 in Einy (1987).
3We borrow this term from Laruelle and Valenciano (2001), although they use it to refer to a
rather di⁄erent property, as we will mention below.
2increase for all players. That is, any gain in power by a player implies a loss for
someone else. The axiom speci￿es neither the identity of players that lose power, nor
the extent of their loss.
The rest of our axioms are standard. We adopt the transfer axiom of Dubey
(1975), and the symmetry and the null player axioms of Shapley (1953). Our The-
orem 1 shows that the four axioms characterize the SSPI up to rescaling. But if
the null player axiom is replaced by the stronger dummy axiom (which is the second
axiom in our set, after gain-loss, to contain a mild aspect of e¢ ciency), the SSPI is
characterized uniquely, as we state in Corollary 2. Moreover, in this characterization,
the symmetry can be replaced by the weaker equal treatment axiom, as shown in
Theorem 3.
In several other works, a characterization of the SSPI or the Shapley value was
done with substitutes for the e¢ ciency axiom. When a power index is viewed as
a utility function that represents a prospective player￿ s preference over the set of
games, Roth (1977) considers the axiom of "strategic risk neutrality". This axiom
requires that a player be indi⁄erent between playing a unanimity game with carrier T,
and participating in a lottery that assigns probability 1=jTj to being a dictator and
probability 1 ￿ 1=jTj to being a null player. It thus determines the index (up to an
a¢ ne transformation) as the e¢ cient SSPI on unanimity games. Also in the context
of treating power indices as utility functions, Blair and McLean (1990) introduce
another substitute of e¢ ciency that pinpoints the e¢ cient Shapley value in the set of
semivalues that they characterize. They require that a player be indi⁄erent between
all symmetric simple games in which the minimal winning coalitions have the same
size. This axiom, when restated in our purely game-theoretic setting, is related to
gain-loss. Speci￿cally, it is weaker than the combination of gain-loss and symmetry,
and can replace gain-loss in our axiomatization as we point out in Remark 1. We do
not introduce it as an explicit axiom in our setting, however, believing that gain-loss
has a stronger aesthetic and conceptual appeal in many contexts.
More recently, Laruelle and Valenciano (2001) introduced the ￿constant total gain-
loss balance￿axiom, which requires that if a minimal winning coalition S is deleted
from a simple game, then the total loss in power of players in S be the same as the
total gain in power of players in the complement of S. Unlike our gain-loss axiom,
3however, this axiom by itself is su¢ ciently close to e¢ ciency. Indeed, it directly
implies that the total power of the players is constant in all games, and hence is a
￿xed multiple of the worth of the grand coalition. This means that the power index
is e¢ cient up to rescaling, provided the total power is non-zero.4
The structure of our paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces simple games and
the de￿nition of the SSPI, and Section 3 contains the statements of our axioms, the
characterization results, and two remarks.
2 Simple Games and the Shapley-Shubik Index of
Power
Let N = f1;2;:::;ng be the set of players. Denote the collection of all coalitions
(subsets of N) by 2N; and the empty coalition by ;: Then a game on N is given by
a map v : 2N ! R with v (;) = 0: The space of all games on N is denoted by G: A
coalition T 2 2N is called a carrier of v if v(S) = v(S \ T) for any S 2 2N:
The domain SG ￿ G of simple games on N consists of all v 2 G such that
(i) v(S) 2 f0;1g for all S 2 2N;
(ii) v(N) = 1;
(ii) v is monotonic, i.e., if S ￿ T then v(S) ￿ v(T):
A coalition S is said to be winning in v 2 SG if v(S) = 1; and losing otherwise.
A power index is a mapping ’ : SG !Rn. For each i 2 N and v 2 SG; the ith
coordinate of ’(v) 2 Rn; ’(v)(i); is interpreted as the voting power of player i in
the game v: The Shapley-Shubik power index (SSPI) ’ss is among the best known.




jSj!(jNj ￿ jSj ￿ 1)!
jNj!
[v(S [ fig) ￿ v(S)]: (1)
For each i 2 N, ’ss (v)(i) is exactly the probability that player i is pivotal in a
random ordering of N (with the uniform distribution of orderings), i.e., the probability
4Our gain-loss axiom also implies that the power (both individual and total) is constant, but only
in conjunction with the equal treatment axiom, and only for the small class of symmetric games, as
can be easily seen (similarly to (5) in Lemma 1).
4that the coalition of players preceding i in a random ordering is losing, but becomes
a winning coalition if joined by i.
3 The Axioms and the Results
We start by exploring the degree of similarity to ’ss that a power on SG must have if it
satis￿es the four axioms stated below. As mentioned, one of the axioms is new, while
the other three are standard. The new axiom is a relaxation of the usual e¢ ciency
requirement. The axiom captures what could be expected intuitively from a measure
of power ￿while it might be the case that the power of some players increases as a
result of changes in the game, power cannot concomitantly increase for all players.
That is, any gain in power by a player must come at the expense of someone else.
Axiom I: Gain-loss (GL). If
’(v)(i) > ’(w)(i) (2)
for some v;w 2 SG and i 2 N; then there exists j 2 N such that
’(v)(j) < ’(w)(j): (3)
The standard e¢ ciency axiom requires that the equality
P
i2N ’(v)(i) = 1 hold
for every v 2 SG. Axiom GL is weaker than e¢ ciency and quantitatively less de-
manding. It speci￿es neither the identity of j that loses power on account of i￿ s gain,
nor the extent of j￿ s loss.
The three axioms that follow and their variants have been used in other character-
izations of the SSPI (see, e.g., Dubey (1975)). To state our next axiom, we introduce
the following notation. For v;w 2 SG de￿ne v _ w;v ^ w 2 SG by:
(v _ w)(S) = maxfv(S);w(S)g;
(v ^ w)(S) = minfv(S);w(S)g
for all S 2 2N: (It is evident that SG is closed under operations _;^:) Thus a coalition
is winning in v _ w if, and only if, it is winning in at least one of v or w, and it is
winning in v ^ w if, and only if, it is winning in both v and w:
5Axiom II: Transfer (T). ’(v _ w)+’(v ^ w) = ’(v)+’(w) for all v;w 2 SG.
As remarked in Dubey et al (2005), T can be restated in the following equivalent
form. Consider two pairs of games v;v0 and w;w0 in SG, and suppose that the
transitions from v0 to v and w0 to w entail adding the same set of winning coalitions
(i.e., v ￿ v0; w ￿ w0; and v ￿ v0 = w ￿ w0). An equivalent axiom would require that
’(v) ￿ ’(v
0) = ’(w) ￿ ’(w
0);
i.e., that the change in power depends only on the change in the voting game.
Next, denote by ￿(N) the set of all permutations of N (i.e., bijections ￿ : N ! N):
For ￿ 2 ￿(N) and a game v 2 SG, de￿ne ￿v 2 SG by
(￿v)(S) = v(￿(S))
for all S 2 2N: The game ￿v is the same as v except that players are relabeled
according to ￿:
Axiom III: Symmetry (Sym). ’(￿v)(i) = ’(v)(￿ (i)) for every v 2 SG,
every i 2 N; and every ￿ 2 ￿(N):
According to Sym, if players are relabeled in a game, their power indices will be
relabeled accordingly. Thus, irrelevant characteristics of the players, outside of their
role in the game v, have no in￿ uence on the power index.
Axiom IV: Null player (NP). If v 2 SG, and i is a null player in v, i.e.,
v(S [ fig) = v(S) for every S ￿ Nnfig; then ’(v)(i) = 0:
Theorem 1. A power index ’ satis￿es GL, T, Sym, and NP if and only if
’ = a’ss for some a 2 R:
Proof. It is well known that ’ss satis￿es T, Sym, and NP. Axiom GL is
satis￿ed since ’ss is e¢ cient, which is a stronger requirement. It is also obvious that
the axioms are invariant under any rescaling of ’ss:
6We now show that the axioms uniquely determine ’ss up to rescaling. To this
end, ￿x a power index ’ that satis￿es GL, T, Sym, and NP.









’(w0)(i) = ’(w1)(i) = ::: = ’(wn￿1)(i) (5)
for every i 2 N:
Proof of Lemma 1. By Sym, for every i;j 2 N and s = 0;1;:::;n ￿ 1;
’(ws)(i) = ’(ws)(j): (6)
If there were 0 ￿ s0;s00 ￿ n ￿ 1 such that (w.l.o.g.) ’(ws0)(i) > ’(ws00)(i) for some
i 2 N; there would exist j 2 N with ’(ws0)(j) < ’(ws00)(j) by GL, contradicting
(6) taken for s = s0;s00. Hence (5) follows. ￿
Following the proof of Lemma in Dubey et al (1981),5 consider the set F of all
power indices on SG that satisfy T, Sym, and NP. Clearly, F is a linear subspace
of the space of all mappings SG !Rn: Now consider, for each T ￿ N; the unanimity





1; if T ￿ S;
0; otherwise.
(7)
Any v 2 SG can be written as a maximum of a ￿nite number of unanimity games:
v = uT1 _ uT2 _ ::: _ uTk;
5Although our aim is to obtain equality (9), which is precesely what is claimed in the Lemma of
Dubey et al (1981), we cannot apply the lemma directly. Indeed, the lemma is stated for semivalues
de￿ned on the space G of all games on N, and not just simple games. Moreover, the axioms of
Dubey et al (1981) are more demanding. Our proof introduces an adjustment that needs to be
made in the context of power indices for simple games.
7where T1;:::; Tk are the minimal winning coalitions in v: Since any f 2 F satis￿es T,










It follows from (8) that the values of a power index f 2 F on unanimity games
uniquely determine the index on the entire SG. Moreover, by Sym and NP, f













(1): Thus, the dimension of F is at most n. It is moreover easy to see




[v(S [ fig) ￿ v(S)]
for each s = 0;1;:::;n ￿ 1 and v 2 SG, are linearly independent. Thus, in fact,
dimF = n; and f0;:::;fn￿1 form a linear basis for F: Consequently, there exists a
collection (ps)
n￿1
s=0 of coe¢ cients such that ’ =
Pn￿1




pjSj [v(S [ fig) ￿ v(S)] (9)


























s!(n ￿ s ￿ 1)!
n!
(11)
for every s = 0;1;::;n ￿ 1: Substituting (11) into (9), and comparing the resulting
equality with (1), yields ’ = a’ss: ￿
Now consider the following well-known stronger version of the NP axiom:
8Axiom V: Dummy (D). If v 2 SG, and i is a dummy player in v, i.e., v(S [
fig) = v(S) + v(fig) for every S ￿ Nnfig; then ’(v)(i) = v (fig):
Note that this is the only axiom in our set that contains a mild quantitative
aspect of e¢ ciency: D implies that
P
i2N ’(v)(i) = 1 in every game v 2 SG where
all players are dummies. However, it su¢ ces to uniquely characterize the SSPI along
with GL, T, and Sym:
Corollary 2. There exists one, and only one, power index satisfying GL, T,
Sym and D, and it is the SSPI ’ss:
Proof. It is well-known that ’ss satis￿es D, and the rest of our axioms are
also satis￿ed, by Theorem 1. Furthermore, if a power index ’ satis￿es the axioms,




(1) = 1 (see (7) for the




(1) = a; which implies that a = 1: ￿
Remark 1 (Weakening of GL). Note that in the proof of Theorem 1, the only
use of GL was to derive, in conjunction with Sym, the equality (5) in Lemma 1, i.e.,
that
’(w0)(i) = ’(w1)(i) = ::: = ’(wn￿1)(i) (12)
for every i 2 N; where w0;:::;wn￿1 are the games de￿ned by (4).6 Thus, the ad-
hoc requirement on ’ that (12) holds for every i 2 N; which is weaker than the
combination of GL and Sym, can be used as a substitute of GL in Theorem 1 and
Corollary 2.
This requirement was used by Blair and McLean (1990) in the context of charac-
terising "subjective valuations" of playing a game, as the axiom that pinpoints the
e¢ cient Shapley value in the set of (not necessarily e¢ cient) semivalues. We do not
introduce (12) as an explicit axiom, however, as we believe that GL is a natural and
desirable property in most contexts, and that it has a stronger aesthetic appeal.
6Note that the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 1 shows that ’(v)(i) is the same for
all symmetric games v 2 SG, and not only for v = w0;:::;wn￿1:
9Remark 2 (Using GL to characterize the Shapley value on the entire
G). Formula (1), applied to every v 2 G, de￿nes the Shapley value ’ss : G !Rn on
the entire G. However, in the context of mappings ’ : G !Rn the straightforward
extension of axiom GL is of little interest. Indeed, if it is assumed that (2) =)
(3) for any v,u 2 G; then GL does not follow from e¢ ciency as was the case for
simple games, and in fact ’ss does not satisfy it. The "right" version of GL for
general games would assume (2) =) (3) provided v(N) = u(N): This version would
characterize the Shapley value on G together with other, standard axioms (linearity,
equal treatment, and dummy).7 However, the explicit conditioning on the worth of
the grand coalition in the axiom signi￿canly limits its appeal as a weaker substitute
for e¢ ciency.
Our last result strengthens Corollary 2 by replacing Sym in the characterization
of the SSPI with the following well-known weaker version:
Axiom VI: Equal Treatment (ET). If i,j 2 N are substitute players in the
game v 2 SG, i.e., for every S ￿ Nnfi;jg v(S [ fig) = v(S [ fjg); then ’(v)(i) =
’(v)(j).
While Sym postulates that irrelevant characteristics of the players, outside of
their role in the game v, have no in￿ uence on a power index, the weaker ET merely
forbids discrimination between substitute players (with the same role in the game).
In most axiomatizations ET su¢ ces for the uniqueness of the index on SG (or the
value on G) when the e¢ ciency is included in the set of axioms. The stronger Sym
is necessary primarily in the conext of in￿nite number of players (see, e.g., Aumann
and Shapley (1974), Dubey et al (1981)). Our next theorem shows that, even with
GL instead of e¢ ciency, ET can replace Sym in the characterization of SSPI.
Theorem 3. There exists one, and only one, power index satisfying GL, T, ET,
and D, and it is the SSPI ’ss:
7This follows from Corollary 1, since the axioms uniquely determine the restriction of the value
to SG; and in particular for unanimity games. Since these games are a linear basis for G, the value
is in fact uniquely determined on G.
10Proof. By Corollary 2, ’ss satis￿es all the axioms. It remains to show that the
axioms uniquely determine ’ss: Fix any power index ’ that satis￿es GL, T, ET,
and D.
Lemma 2. For every T ￿ N
’(uT) = ’ss (uT); (13)
where uT is the unanimity game on T de￿ned in (7).
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider the following two cases:











for every v 2 SG and i 2 N: It is easy to check that ’ satis￿es T, Sym (and not just
ET), and D.
For every i;j 2 N and s = 0;1;:::;n ￿ 1;
’(ws)(i) = ’(ws)(j) (14)
by ET, where ws is the game de￿ned in (4). Since ￿ws = ws for every ￿ 2 ￿(N), it
follows from the de￿nition of ’ and (14) that
’(ws)(i) = ’(ws)(i) (15)
for every s = 0;1;:::;n￿1 and i 2 N: Since Lemma 1 holds with ET instead of Sym
as is easy to check, for every i 2 N
’(w1)(i) = ’(w2)(i) = ::: = ’(wn)(i);
and thus, using (15), also
’(w1)(i) = ’(w2)(i) = ::: = ’(wn)(i): (16)
11This shows that ’ satis￿es (12) in Remark 1 (in addition to T, Sym, and D), and
hence by Remark 1 and Corollary 2, ’ = ’ss: Since ’(wn￿1) = ’(wn￿1) by (15), in
fact
’(wn￿1) = ’ss (wn￿1):
But wn￿1 = uN; and thus (13) is established for T = N:
Case 2: T   N. Denote by SG(T) the set of simple games on the set of players
T, that can at the same time be viewed as the games in SG whose carrier is a subset
of T: Consider the restricted power index ’ jT: SG(T) !RT; given by (’ jT)(v)(i) ￿
’(v)(i) for every v 2 SG(T) and i 2 T: Since by D ’(v)(i) = 0 for every v 2 SG(T)
and i = 2 T; the knowledge of ’ jT completely determines ’ on SG(T) when viewed as
a subset of SG.
It is easy to see that ’ jT satis￿es axioms T, ET, and D on SG(T). It also satis￿es
GL. To check this, assume that (2) holds for some i 2 T and v,u 2 SG(T): By the
GL property of ’; there exists j 2 N satisfying (3). It cannot be that j 2 NnT
since then the inequality in (3) would not be strict by the D property of ’; and we
conclude that j 2 T:8
Now, just as in Case 1 (mimic the proof by taking N = T and n ￿ jTj),
(’ jT)(uT) = (’ss jT)(uT);
and thus also
’(uT) = ’ss (uT):
Consequently, (13) holds for every T ￿ N: ￿
By Lemma 2, ’ and ’ss coincide on all unanimity games. Using equality (8) in the
proof of Theorem 1 (which holds for any power index f that satis￿es T, by Lemma
2.3 of Einy (1987), and in particular for ’ and ’ss) ￿nally implies that ’ = ’ss on
the entire SG: ￿
8This is the only place in our proofs where the assumption of strict inequality in (3) is used. For
our previous results, Theorem 1 and Corollary 2, a weak inequality in (3) would have su¢ ced.
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